The US, EU and Russia have said partition could be an option for Kosovo.
Have they learned nothing from Northern Ireland?
The US, EU and Russia have said partition could be an option for Kosovo.
Have they learned nothing from Northern Ireland?
Russia has begun a major air defence programme, the first step of which is a radar station near St Petersburg.
I’ve blogged in the past about Russia’s newfound confidence, partially based on the assertiveness of president Vladimir Putin but partially on its oil wealth.
The defence project, which will continue until 2015 and is in response to US plans for a missile shield in Eastern Europe, is another example of this. However, it’s ominous in the context of what else the Russian military has been getting up to.
It has resumed flights into US and NATO-controlled airspace, for instance over Guam when US jets were scrambled to intercept the bombers.
Major General Pavel Androsov said:
Whenever we saw US planes during our flights over the ocean, we greeted them. On Wednesday, we renewed the tradition when our young pilots flew by Guam in two planes. We exchanged smiles with our counterparts who flew up from a US carrier and returned home.
However, a Pentagon spokesman said:
We prepared to intercept the bombers but they did not come close enough to a US Navy ship or to the island of Guam to warrant an air-to-air intercept.
Flights toward enemy territory was standard practice for both sides during the Cold War, when bombers and jets were constantly in the air as a deterrent and to enable a rapid response to any hostilities.
It’s worrying Russia has resumed the strategy, even if it was in response to a US military exercise. In a tense situation a slight error can have catastrophic consequences.
Also of concern is the deployment along the Georgian border. About 1,500 troops have been sent to the region to tackle “bandits”. Given the history between Russia and Georgia, this could be simply more manoeuvring and sabre rattling — particularly after the missile incident near South Ossetia.
There was yet more sabre rattling in south Asia this morning when Pakistan testfired a nuclear-capable cruise missile.
The Babur Hatf VII missile hugs the ground to avoid radar and has a range of 700km (enough to reach the Indian capital New Delhi). It isn’t the first time it’s been tested, so this probably marks further refinement of the system.
Pakistan and India have competed on weapons technology for years, most significantly with the testing of nuclear weapons by both sides. After an attack on the Indian parliament in 2001, blamed on Pakistan, led to a military build-up along the border, a nuclear exchange seemed probable.
India vowed not to use nukes first but said it could take a “bomb or two or more … but when we respond there will be no Pakistan” (go here for more of the tough guy rhetoric). Thankfully cooler heads prevailed and there was a climbdown. Now the neighbours notify one another in advance of any missile tests.
Pakistan has an established policy of military development, as much to deter any would-be invader as to showboat. That the Babur Hatf can carry nuclear warheads is significant, but it can carry conventional explosives as well and its design means it can be used to carry out devastating, unstoppable strikes.
Nuclear technology, in the US at least, has progressed to the point that uber-accurate strikes can obliterate an enemy’s heavy military while causing only a few casualties.
Pakistan’s latest test must be seen in the context of domestic politics, its long rivalry with India and, to an extent, raising its regional and international profile. India will feel under little pressure to respond with a test of its own but its smaller neighbour has shown it won’t go away and is not complacent with its hardware.
There may also be anti-Taliban publicity in all of this, although given Pakistan’s test history I don’t think this is a major factor. Certainly some US politicians have been crowing about tackling militants in Pakistan — notably Rudy Giuliani, who seems to think America is fighting a war in Pakistan.
However, I think it’s worth seeing the missile test as pro-government publicity in a time of dubious internal security. The Red Mosque incident has left many shaken, and President Musharaff’s run-ins with the chief justice caused mass protests and violence in the streets.
Now, though, he can point to tangible success on his nation’s behalf. He can say to his electorate: “This is what we can achieve while I’m in office”. Perhaps not in those words, but the sentiment will be there.
This latest posturing is highly unlikely to destablise the region — but it serves as a warning that conflicts do not go away overnight, and the technology that can be unleashed if relations worsen dramatically.
The six medics convicted of infecting 460 Libyan children with HIV have been released and are back in Bulgaria.
They had been spared the death penalty in favour of life imprisonment after a compensation deal (reputed to be $1m per child) was reached with the childrens’ families. Now it seems a political deal between the EU and Libya has got them out of prison.
I’m glad they’re free. The case was a farce and an example of outsiders being blamed for internal errors — during the trial a French scientist testified poor hygiene at the hospital likely led to the contamination of the blood used in the transfusions. This happened in 1997, two years before the medics arrived in Libya. They had confessed, but have since alleged this was tortured out of them.
While I welcome their release I have some concerns about the deal. The EU and Tripoli have apparently agreed a “partnership” (or at least agreed to work toward one). What this will entail is unclear. The first thought I had when I read the term “partnership” was of Libya joining the union. Perhaps it was just a stray neuron hoping to go out in style.
Libya has for the last four or five years been attempting to normalise relations with the world at large.
The country is wealthier than most in northern Africa because of its oil reserves — reserves which have recently been opened up to foreign companies. The medics’ case has blocked closer ties between the EU and Libya, but now the case has been resolved political and economic progress can be made.
Economically it makes sense for the EU to court Tripoli. I think it can be taken as given that the oil supply across Terra has been drastically depleted — and cordial relations between the union and Gaddafi’s country would certainly allow Europe freer access to such badly needed reserves.
Libya’s coast is not that far away from Italy. Pipelines have stretched further; for example, gas pipes stretch from Russia to western Europe.
I hope I am just being cynical. I would like to think there were altruistic concerns, and that the medics were brought home simply because of the injustice of their situation. But the skeptic in the back of my mind insists something else has happened. I fear the medics’ situation has been used for political gains on both sides. I hope I’m wrong.
Update 26/07/07: French president Nicolas Sarkozy had met with Gaddafi, promising to help Libya rejoin “the concert of nations”. The article points out that French firms have been losing out since US companies re-entered the north African country, so Sarkozy is eager to make sure things don’t go to pot.
A line from the Libyan foreign minister has me concerned, though. He said France and Libya are to sign an agreement on “co-operation on a military-industrial partnership”.
I appreciate France’s historical ties to Africa, although it never ruled over Libya. However, I don’t see the logic of forming such a partnership.
France is a major arms exporter, so in that respect the deal would probably benefit most Gaddafi’s nation (and the arms manufacturers too). But why sign the deal? That it’s “military-industrial” implies a manufacturing aspect to the agreement. Does it mean French arms firms will be setting up shop in Libya, or that a multimillion-dollar revamp of the Libyan armed forces is on the way?
I’ll watch this with interest. Is France preparing an anti-terror front? Is it securing its business interests in north Africa? Is it making a good diplomatic impression to ensure preferential access to Libya oil? Perhaps all of the above and more.
Israel has released 250 (carefully selected) Palestinian prisoners in a bid to bolster Mahmoud Abbas.
The ex-inmates are almost all from Abbas’ Fatah group, with a few from smaller organisations such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. None are from Hamas — releasing a Hamas prisoner would have defeated the purpose of the exercise.
All the men signed a document promising not to take part in violence against Israel. I imagine a good many probably will — it’s a good sign when you read quotes like this:
Amjad Namura, 24, of Hebron, who was freed after serving half of a four-year sentence, said he was happy to comply with any agreement signed off by Abbas.
“We are with the decisions of the president no matter what. Whatever Fatah tells me to do I will do it,” he said.
There are always one or two nutjobs/fanatics in every group so some will have to be watched very carefully, even if none of those released were actually involved in attacks on Israelis.
It is a solid gesture from Israel to shore up Abbas, who has seen the Palestinian territories split in two. Unfortunately, it won’t give him the momentum to take power back from Hamas, which is governing a de facto state in the Gaza Strip.
What the release — and the looming early legislative and presidential elections — will do is cement the divide. Hamas won the parliamentary elections last year and in all likelihood will simply ignore any new vote. Ismail Haniyeh has yet to acknowledge having been replaced as Palestinian prime minister, so why should his party colleagues acknowledge they’ve lost their seats?
Calling new elections, which is an understandable enough course of action, runs the risk of legitimising the break-up of Palestinian territory. This is dangerous because although Gaza cannot economically survive on its own, that doesn’t mean it won’t continue to exist outside the control of centralised authority.
Both sides have repeatedly said they do not want to split. Unfortunately reality and ambition are often two very distinct entities. A commenter on my International Analyst article raised the possibility of a multinational force going in to Gaza, but that is a very remote possibility.
Abbas is about to take one of the biggest gambles of his life. For the sake of peace in the Middle East, let’s hope it pays off.

George W Bush is on increasingly shaky ground. Not only has Congress voted to pull US troops out of Iraq by April 1, 2008 (though he will veto this), but members of his own party are turning against him.
It’s about time.
He has been a disaster for the Middle East. It will take years to repair the damage his administration has done to the region, if that is even possible. Only the Australian defence minister has been forthright enough to admit his country is in Iraq for oil — it would be so refreshing for the US (and Britain) to at least admit this is a factor in keeping them there.
I won’t sit here and pretend a US withdrawal from Iraq will solve everything overnight. It’s scary to think of the future that awaits the Middle East once the occupation ends. A shambles of a nation bordering seven countries… It is worrying that Iraq is ahead of Somalia on the failed states index, as Somalia has essentially been an anarchy for years.
For a vision of where Iraq may be headed based on experiences in Basra, check out this report from the International Crisis Group.
I feel obliged to point out that, according to this map at least, much of the country is under Iraqi government control. However, it does not indicate if control is total, nominal etc. Iraqi PM Nouri al-Maliki says his nation’s army and police are capable of maintaining order once the US leaves. It is important for Iraq’s self-esteem as a country and the credibility of al-Maliki’s government that they do.
That the US military has begun arming Sunni militia to fight al-Qaida in Anbar province is tacit acceptance that an American victory is impossible. Not only that, it could allow old local grudges to be settled and set the scene for well-armed militias to rule the roost once coalition forces leave.
Bush has made much of the “liberation of Iraq from Saddam Hussein” and the “return of sovereignty to the Iraqi people” (quotes from this transcript). Liberation from a man the US helped put in power and whom the CIA assisted during the Iran-Iraq war.
Unfortunately Iraqis have used this liberation to catch up on decades of sectarian conflict which was oppressed under Saddam (and it is not the first country where this has happened).
I am not for one second saying that Saddam’s leadership was a good thing. Although relatively stable compared to its successor state, his was a brutal regime and many thousands of people suffered under it.
However, many thousands have suffered in a democratic Iraq. There have been months when as many civilians died as did during the whole of the conflict in Northern Ireland (c. 3,500). America does not have a good track record of encouraging or forcing regime change: just think of Chile, Cambodia and Guatemala.
It was natural that, in the power vacuum following Saddam’s fall, local groups would work to secure their vested interests. Hence the formation of an Iraqi parliament along sectarian lines (and feel free to leave a comment if I’m missing something here).
A fragmented Iraq is a dangerous thing, as it invites external actors. For example, Turkey has 200,000 troops along the border with Iraqi Kurdish territories. I have already written about what could come of this (here and here). Iran must also be looking at the situation, particularly given the history between it and Iraq.
To argue that the move by Republican senators Richard Lugar and John Warner (linked to in the first paragraph) isn’t significant because they have not set a date for the withdrawal of armed forces would be to miss the point — it underscores divisions within Bush’s party and a wider opposition to the war in Iraq.
It would require Bush to re-seek authorisation for the war, authorisation he has had since 2002. Although it would still be up to the president to pull out of Iraq, he would have to submit revised plans by October 16. These plans, the senators urge, would include “a drawdown or redeployment of forces”.
Bush wants to keep things as they are until the US commander in Iraq, General Petraeus, delivers his report in September — and Petraeus, using Northern Ireland as an example, has said countering an insurgency could take ten years or more.
Reports on Iraq are not worth waiting for. This week saw one by the Bush administration that said the Iraqi government had made satisfactory progress toward eight of 18 benchmarks, unsatisfactory progress on eight more and mixed results on the others. You can read the report here.
“I believe we can succeed in Iraq, and I know we must,” Bush has said.
There comes a time in every man’s life when he must realise he can not win. This is surely the time for Bush. A withdrawal plan must be put in place as soon as possible.
Would the situation in Iraq be any different if it was a force of UN peacekeepers? The UN is not the greatest organisation in the world but its cordial relations with Hezbollah in Lebanon demonstrates it has the capacity to sink substantial roots in the region.
It seems Bush is not the only US official with his head in the sand. Writes Anne Flaherty of AP:
At a news conference Friday (July 13), the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace, said the number of battle-ready Iraqi battalions able to fight independently has dropped from 10 to six in recent months despite an increase in U.S. training efforts.
Pace said the readiness of the Iraqi fighting units was not an issue to be “overly concerned” about because the problem was partly attributable to losses in the field.
“As units operate in the field, they have casualties, they consume vehicles and equipment,” Pace said.
Hang on for just one moment please. Did he just say the loss of four battalions wasn’t something to be “overly concerned” about? A battalion can have hundreds of soldiers (I’m unsure of the exact make-up of an Iraqi battalion, but such a unit in the US army has 300-1,000 as far as I know).
That four battalions — lost either through attrition or lack of resources — can no longer act independently is not something that should be dismissed as a matter of no consequence. Their country needs them. I hope they are rebuilt and back in the field as soon as possible — for Iraq’s sake.
I invite your comments and observations.